时间：2025年5月29日（周四）13:25
地点：浙大管院A203会议室
主题：Does PCAOB Auditing Oversight Improve Information Processing in Executive Contracting? Evidence from Valuation Allowance
主讲人：周南教授，美国辛辛那提大学会计系主任
主持人简介：
Nan Zhou is Professor and Head of the Accounting Department at the University of Cincinnati. He holds the Norwood and Marjorie Geis Chair of Accounting. Professor Zhou helped relaunch the Accounting Ph.D. Program in 2019. He is currently working with the Lindner College of Business and UC Online to launch the Online Bachelor of Business Administration – Accounting in Fall 2025. His research on auditing, financial reporting, and corporate governance has been published in leading accounting journals, including The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Contemporary Accounting Research, and Review of Accounting Studies. He led the UC Accounting Department to successfully organize and host the Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance ESG Symposium in October 2024. He currently serves as a Co-Editor of Asian Review of Accounting, an Editor of China Accounting and Finance Review, and an Associate Editor of Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation. Professor Zhou obtained his bachelor's degree from Tsinghua University, MBA from Southern Illinois University Carbondale, and PhD in Accounting from the University of Minnesota. He received the Lindner Research Excellence Award from the Lindner College of Business at the University of Cincinnati and the Corning Award for Excellence in Research from the School of Management at State University of New York (SUNY) Binghamton University.
摘要：
We investigate whether PCAOB auditing oversight enhances the information processing capabilities of boards in executive contracting, specifically through the lens of valuation allowance reporting. Used as a quasi-natural experiment, the 2007 public release of Deloitte’s PCAOB Part II report prompted Deloitte clients to enhance the reporting of valuation allowances, which we use to differentiate between persistent and transitory losses. Following the report’s release, Deloitte’s clients exhibit greater sensitivity to valuation allowance signals, awarding less compensation to CEOs during years with persistent losses. This shift is not observed among other Big Four clients. In particular, the effect is concentrated in firms with overlapping directors serving on both the audit and compensation committees. These overlapping directors with accounting expertise facilitate information processing, leading to more informed decisions in executive contracting. Since improved accounting estimates can better guide corporate actions, we find that Deloitte clients are less likely to dismiss CEOs during years of transitory losses and improve investment efficiency after the public release of Deloitte’s inspection report. Collectively, our findings suggest that PCAOB inspections provide critical informational benefits that enable compensation committees, especially those with accounting expertise, to better align executive incentives with firm performance.
