Capacity Auctions : VCG Mechanism vs. Submodularity
时间：2019年6月19日（周三）上午 9:30-11:00
地点：浙江大学紫金港校区行政楼1102会议室
主讲人：Professor Bo Chen，University of Warwick, UK
主持人：王明征 教授，yl23411永利
摘要：
Using supply chain as an example, we study a form of capacity mechanism that combines capacity and supply auctions. We characterize how participants bid in this auction and show that, on a pay-as-bid basis, an equilibrium behavior gives Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) profits and achieves efficient outcomes when there is submodularity, which is in stark contrast with what in the existing literature— at equilibrium VCG payments achieve truthful bids and efficiency. We also provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for submodularity.
主讲人简介：
Professor Bo Chen (陈礴), Chair of Operations Research & Management Science and Co-director of DIMAP (Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications),University of Warwick, UK. He is Fellow of the UK Operational Research Society (FORS), Fellow of the UK Institute of Mathematics and Its Applications (FIMA),and Fellow of the UK Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS). He has been a Nominator for Nobel Prize in Economics since 2006. He currently serves as Associate Editor for ten international academic journals of high standing. His main research interests include optimization, scheduling and transportation, and game theory with mechanism design.
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